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COMMENT ON LAWYERS
AS GATEKEEPERS
Thomas D. Morgan
t
It is a privilege to be here today and it is with no lack of respect for
any of the preceding speakers that some of the comments I make to-
day will contrast with those you have heard.1 I will make four basic
points and hope that my remarks will at least help put some of the
earlier ideas into perspective.
First, it seems to me clear that the massive corporate wrongdoing
we have recently seen has not been caused by insufficient lawyer reg-
ulation. For at least thirty-five years, lawyers have been extensively
regulated by states acting through rules based first on the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility and now on the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. It is and always has been improper in
every state for a lawyer to participate in any of the kinds of corporate
misconduct that we have read and heard about.
2
It has been illegal under what is now Model Rule 1.2(d), for ex-
ample, for a lawyer to counsel or assist a client's crime or fraud.3 A
lawyer also has an obligation under Model Rule 1.44 to keep the client
informed about any information relating to the representation, includ-
ing information concerning a corporate fraud about which the lawyer
is aware, and under Model Rule 1.13(b) to report information about
fraud or other illegality up the corporate management ladder.5
In addition, Model Rule 1.16(a) requires lawyers to withdraw from
any representation in which they are aware that their client is involved
t Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
Editor's Note: Professor Morgan presented these comments in response to a paper not
being published in this Symposium. The editors have published these comments because they
provide additional ideas to those in other papers in the Symposium.
2 See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, LAWYER LAW: COMPARING THE ABA MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr WITH THE ALI RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
606-18 (2005).
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(d) (2002).
4 E.g., id. R. 1.4(a)(5), (b).
5 Id. R. 1.13(b).
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in criminal or fraudulent conduct, 6 and Model Rule 1.6(b) now
reflects the law that has existed in most states permitting a lawyer to
disclose the intention of the client to commit a crime or fraud, or even
the fact that the client has committed a crime or fraud to the extent the
effects of the misconduct can be mitigated. Finally, Model Rule
1.13(c) now gives a lawyer the right to report client misconduct to
regulatory authorities, not simply corporate management, 8 and Model
Rule 4. 1(b) imposes an obligation on a lawyer in some circumstances
to warn persons who might be injured by a crime or fraud being
committed by a client.9
In short, the SEC regulations that we have discussed today are ba-
sically taken from state rules with which lawyers should have been
familiar for an extended period of time. The point has been made cor-
rectly that those were state rules, and it is absolutely true that the
states have done a terrible job of enforcing these rules through the
disciplinary system. If the truth be known, the states have done a ter-
rible job, in general, in enforcing lawyer discipline standards.
What has substituted for the threat of lawyer discipline, however,
is the world of lawyer malpractice. Lawyer liability has exploded,
beginning in about 1990 with the filing of the savings-and-loan fail-
ure cases. Firms have faced major consequences, paying judgments of
$50 million or more for their failure to meet their professional respon-
sibilities.' 0 Regardless of how much insurance these firms have, under
any typical policy there is a "retention" or deductible amount that
means it costs the lawyers significant money out of pocket. In other
cases, the lawyers have reportedly borne all the losses because their
policies do not cover the lawyers' own participation in a fraud."
My point is that there is a significant liability regime that people
who only count discipline cases tend to miss. That regime has led to
an enormous amount of education and review in law firms, primarily
stimulated by lawyer malpractice insurance companies who are very
anxious for lawyers to understand and comply with the law. That real-
ity should not be overlooked as we think about what the rules should
be.
6Id. R. 1.16(a)(1).
7 Id. R. 1.6(b)(2) & (3).
8 Id. R. 1.13(c).
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4.1(b) (2002).
10 See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp. v. Uncoln Sav. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp.
1424, 1450-52 (D. Ariz. 1992) ($51 million settlement).
I E.g., FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) ($35 million judgment).
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That Sarbanes-Oxley 12 transformed state rules into a federal
requirement is not a trivial matter, but federalizing the rules did not
really change the dynamics of the problem of getting lawyers to act. I
hesitate to use a sensitive analogy but the easiest law to get a
legislature to pass today would be a law against the shootings in
public schools that the country has recently seen. Yet we all know, if
we think about it at all, that we have had state laws against murder for
a long time. The dynamics of situations that lead people to shoot up
public schools are not going to be changed significantly simply by
adopting a new body of laws. I believe the same is true of the
dynamics of situations in which lawyers appear not to catch corporate
misconduct.
13
Second, I know I am a lone wolf on this point, but I think the term
"gatekeeper" is almost useless. Indeed, it is worse than useless in that
it tends to get in the way of sound thinking about the lawyer-client
relationship. Even the articles on gatekeepers reveal that it is not a
very clearly defined term. 14 At one level it is used positively, i.e., to
describe the world in the sense of saying that lawyers are involved in
corporate transactions and can have influence. That much we all
agree. But "gatekeeper" is also used normatively to suggest that
somehow less wrongdoing would occur if it were not for lawyer
complicity.
The latter view, I respectfully suggest, is simply not true. A lot of
wrongdoing-environmental pollution, for example-often takes
place in settings where lawyers have not been directly involved in the
situation at all. In those and many other cases, trying to know what
has happened and then trying to report accurately what has happened
both represent continuing challenges for lawyers. Most corporate
wrongdoers do not wear signs saying "Criminal." The normative view
is sometimes expressed as a preference that we set up a kind screener
group who will certify, or give a "Good Housekeeping seal," to dis-
closure documents. With all respect, again, that is virtually impossible
to do unless one assumes perfect knowledge or sufficient imagination
to anticipate where most of the hidden problems are.
I think we can all look back at Enron, and say people should have
known something was wrong. But there are many circumstances that
12 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
13 I have previously made this argument in Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Com-
plication, Not a Contribution, in the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers' Professional Con-
duct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2003).
14 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid",
57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002).
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are not remotely that clear. My own view is that we ought to be striv-
ing to see the lawyer as a counselor-a goader toward proper conduct
and proper reporting-rather than as a gatekeeper. This would have a
couple effects. One is that it would align the standard to how most
lawyers try to think of themselves. As both Geralyn Presti15 and Jo-
seph Bauer suggested during this Symposium, companies basically
want to do the right thing. The number of companies out there who
are saying to themselves "how can we figure out a way to act dishon-
estly" may not be zero, but it is relatively few. If you have one of
those companies as your client, you should get out of that representa-
tion immediately.
Lawyers should then ask themselves how they can structure the re-
lationship in a way that will help reestablish the kind of trust and mu-
tual respect of the kind that Professor Geoffrey Miller suggests may
have existed back in the club era but that is harder to achieve in a
world that we now understand is more market driven and competi-
tive.16 That is indeed a challenge, and I don't have the complete an-
swer to how to achieve it, but I think that it is the right direction in
which to point.
The second aspect of this idea is that if we could adopt that coop-
erative point of view, perhaps we could come closer to avoiding some
of the problems we have seen lately in terms of preserving the attor-
ney-client privilege. If you release privileged information to some-
body with whom you have a common interest, you have not waived
the privilege. If lawyers are truly gatekeepers rather than counselors,
we run the risk of getting ourselves into a situation in which the re-
lease of privileged communications to outside counsel, who would be
deemed a gatekeeper, might be regarded as disclosure to an adverse
party, such that release of the information would be a privilege waiv-
er. That would take what should be a straightforward communication
with counsel and make it a lot more complicated and risky than it has
to be.17
My third point is to suggest that there is a downside to noisy
withdrawal. What I am seeing is the use of the power that the
15 Geralyn M. Presti, Current Ethical Issues for Securities Lawyers-A Comment on
Humes, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357 (2007).
16 Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1105 (2005).
17 The courts are at least beginning to catch on to this idea that auditors have a common
interest with the company. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny, 229 F.R.D. 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). we talk about auditors as gatekeepers too, but in fact, they have an interest in
trying to help the company report accurately and comply with its legal requirements. If we can
get the courts to see everybody as on a team, then we can begin to clarify some of these attor-
ney-client privilege issues, I think, in a way that will be helpful.
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attorneys are given by the SEC rules as a tool in what I would
describe as corporate politics. We have all assumed that the
corporation has a single purpose, a single direction, and that all the
people in it are either honest or dishonest. The fact of the matter is
that there are multiple elements in most corporations. Sometimes
someone in a company may want his or her point of view taken more
seriously and thus will assert that the other person's point of view
constitutes illegality. Indeed, it is not only illegal, it is so illegal that
the lawyer or other employee threatens to take the issue to the audit
committee. It may be allegedly so illegal that there is a requirement to
report under Sarbanes-Oxley and the whistleblower protection that
goes with that reporting arises. That kind of misuse of the obligations
lawyers have is a problem that I believe would only be exacerbated
by a requirement of noisy withdrawal.
I have suggested, as well, that noisy withdrawal represents the
worst of all worlds. 18 Both the SEC rules and Model Rules 1.6(b) and
1.13(c) establish a system of permissive withdrawal and indeed per-
missive disclosure of exactly what the problem is thought to be. Noi-
sy withdrawal, on the other hand, is what I call a game of charades, in
which the disclosing party may wave his or her arms and possibly
make faces, but he or she may not tell people what they really need to
know. More seriously, if lawyers or their clients then have to tell the
market that a law firm or a lawyer withdrew at XYZ company, that
information will almost certainly have an impact on investors that
may or may not be assessed accurately. Almost inevitably, people that
were holding the stock will be less wealthy tomorrow than they were
yesterday. At some point, the market may well learn enough informa-
tion to correct itself, but the idea that more information is inevitably
better than less-at least if the information is bad or ambiguous-is in
my view simply wrong.
Fourth and finally, I would suggest that one of the biggest threats
to the world of increased reporting and increased sensitivity to fraud
issues these days is the work of the ABA Task Force on the Attorney
Client Privilege. 19 I do not mean to attack its members personally.
They have put in a lot of time and effort on a volunteer basis to try to
help improve the situation, but that committee has gotten two
propositions through the ABA House of Delegates that I believe are
problematic.
18 E.g., Testimony of Thomas D. Morgan, Hearing on the Role of Attorneys in Corporate
Governance, before the Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, United States House of Representatives
(Feb. 4, 2004).
19 The Task Force website is http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml.
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The first Task Force proposition is that corporate lawyers now
have an obligation to the individual constituents in the organization to
protect their individual attorney-client privilege. I certainly agree that
corporate lawyers have to tell those with whom they deal whom they
represent and that they are not the individual's lawyer.2° Indeed, I
would have lawyers say, "I'm the corporation's lawyer and if you
want your own lawyer, you will have to go hire one." But that duty to
warn is a separate question from whether the corporate counsel has a
duty to help the individuals protect their individual rights. In my
judgment, the obligation is to the company, not to the individuals.
Second, the ABA Task Force has resisted allowing companies to
get credit for engaging in privileged internal investigations and then
waiving the privilege in dealings with the Justice Department, the
SEC, or anybody else in an effort to try to clear things up. As Richard
Humes noted, 2 many people like the idea of limited waiver as a sub-
stantive matter, but the politics of it today are couched in allegations
that one should fight evildoers in the enforcement agencies rather
than genuinely help clients get out of whatever mess they find them-
selves in. Surely, the ABA can propose something better than that and
the rest of us should not take it seriously.
20 MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2002).
21 Richard Humes, Remarks of an SEC Associate General Counsel, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 341 (2007).
[Vol. 57:2
